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Exclusive contracts in bilaterally duopolistic industries

Bakó, Barna (2010) Exclusive contracts in bilaterally duopolistic industries. Working Paper. Corvinus University of Budapest. (Submitted)

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Abstract

The purpose of this article is to analyze the incentives of manufacturers to deal exclusively with retailers in bilaterally duopolistic industries with brand differentiation by manufacturers. With highly differentiated products exclusive contracts are shown to generate higher profits for manufacturers and retailers, who thus have an incentive to insist on exclusive contracting. However, if the products are close substitutes no exclusivity will emerge in equilibrium.

Item Type:Monograph (Working Paper)
Uncontrolled Keywords:exclusive contracts, product dierentiation, vertical integration, welfare analysis
Divisions:Faculty of Economics > Department of Microeconomics
Subjects:Economics
References:
ID Code:260
Deposited By: Barna Bakó
Deposited On:15 Feb 2011 15:56
Last Modified:03 Jul 2012 00:24

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