Weighted nucleoli and dually essential coalitions

Solymosi, Tamás (2019) Weighted nucleoli and dually essential coalitions. International Journal of Game Theory, 2019 (48). pp. 1087-1109. DOI

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We consider linearly weighted versions of the least core and the (pre)nuceolus and investigate the reduction possibilities in their computation. We slightly extend some well-known related results and establish their counterparts by using the dual game. Our main results imply, for example, that if the core of the game is not empty, all dually inessential coalitions (which can be weakly minorized by a partition in the dual game) can be ignored when we compute the per-capita least core and the per-capita (pre)nucleolus from the dual game. This could lead to the design of polynomial time algorithms for the per-capita (and other monotone nondecreasingly weighted versions of the) least core and the (pre)nucleolus in specific classes of balanced games with polynomial many dually essential coalitions.

Item Type:Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:per-capita (pre)nucleolus, least core, computation
Divisions:Faculty of Economics > Department of Operations Research and Actuarial Sciences
Subjects:Decision making
Mathematics, Econometrics
Projects:NKFI K 119930
ID Code:5292
Deposited By: Veronika Vitéz
Deposited On:02 Apr 2020 14:20
Last Modified:02 Apr 2020 14:20

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