Endogenous timing of moves in an asymmetric price-setting duopoly

Tasnádi, Attila (2003) Endogenous timing of moves in an asymmetric price-setting duopoly. Portuguese Economic Journal, 2 (1). pp. 23-35. DOI 10.1007/s10258-002-0018-3

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This paper adds to the growing literature on endogenous timing of decisions in duopolies. We show for a price-setting duopoly game with sufficiently asymmetric and strictly convex cost functions that the less efficient firm moves first while the more efficient moves second with a higher price than the less efficient firm.

Item Type:Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:price-setting games, price leadership, dominant firm, JEL codes: D43, L13
Divisions:Faculty of Economics > Department of Mathematics
Subjects:Mathematics, Econometrics
ID Code:899
Deposited By: Ádám Hoffmann
Deposited On:20 Sep 2012 13:33
Last Modified:18 Oct 2021 10:48

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