Fake reviews and naive consumers

Knapp, Boris (2026) Fake reviews and naive consumers. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2026 . pp. 1-42. DOI 10.1093/jleo/ewag010

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewag010

Abstract

Online reviews affect consumer choices and are therefore frequently faked. Not all consumers are aware of this. In a model with fake reviews and naive consumers, the unique equilibrium is characterized by partial pooling, where fake reviews are persuasive and blend in with real ones. Raising consumer awareness has opposing effects on the naive and aware consumer groups. If real reviews are written strategically, they are not always truthful. Under favorable market conditions, the equilibrium with all strategic reviewers is outcome equivalent to one with all aware consumers. Thus, awareness campaigns can yield similar outcomes, regardless of their target audience (JEL C72, D82, D83, L15)

Item Type:

Article

Uncontrolled Keywords:

fake reviews; online reviews; naive consumers; noncooperative games; information and knowledge; communication; information and product quality;

JEL classification:

C72 - Noncooperative Games
D82 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: Asymmetric and Private Information - Mechanism Design
D83 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: Search - Learning - Information and Knowledge - Communication - Belief
L15 - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility

Divisions:

Institute of Economics

Subjects:

Decision making
Mathematics, Econometrics
Media and communication

DOI:

10.1093/jleo/ewag010

ID Code:

12674

Deposited By:

MTMT SWORD

Deposited On:

31 Mar 2026 11:21