Németh, Bálint (2014) A korrupció formális modelljei. Technical Report. Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem, Budapest. (Unpublished)
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Abstract
Áttekintésünkben a korrupció formális mikroökonómiai és játékelméleti modelljeire összpontosítunk. A korrupciós jelenségek sokszínűsége az egységes modellkeret hiányát implikálja, ami a korrupció univerzális definíciójának hiányában olykor tisztázatlan fogalomhasználathoz vezet a szakirodalomban. Ez megnehezítheti a modellek feltételrendszerének és következtetéseinek egyértelmű összevetését. A klasszikus megközelítés szerint a korrupt viselkedés megfelelő bérrendszer kialakításával (egyfajta hatékonysági bér megfizetésével), valamint a büntetések maximalizálásával szüntethető meg. Számos kutatás hívja fel azonban a figyelmet ezen ösztönzők visszás hatásaira (magasabb kenőpénzek és kontraszelekció). Noha a korrupció hatékony voltát támogató érvek nem plauzibilisek, egy második legjobb világban a korrupció teljes megszüntetése sem feltétlenül optimális. A korrupció által okozott költségek a bürokrácia minőségétől és centralizáltságától egyaránt függnek. Több modell támasztja alá azt a megfigyelést, hogy a korrupcióellenes intézkedések hatásossága rendkívül alacsony lehet, ha a korrupció ársadalmi beágyazottsága magas. Ez kedvezőtlen esetben állandósult és önfenntartó korrupcióhoz vezethet, ami a társadalmi normák kiemelt szerepére hívja fel a figyelmet.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Technical Report) |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | korrupció, corruption |
| JEL classification: | D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation D82 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: Asymmetric and Private Information - Mechanism Design |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Economics > Department of Mathematics |
| Subjects: | Decision making Economics |
| Projects: | MTA-BCE "Lendület" Stratégiai Interakciók Kutatócsoport |
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| ID Code: | 1636 |
| Deposited By: | Attila Tasnádi |
| Deposited On: | 02 Jul 2014 06:43 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Jul 2014 06:43 |
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